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PREMATURE JUDICIAL TERMINATION OF
NON-SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS:
RECONCILING A DEAD SETTLOR'S
INTENT WITH A LIVING
BENEFICIARY'S NEEDS
INTRODUCTION

Trusts currently are popular tools for transferring property from
generation to generation because they are simple to create, offer tax
savings, and allow beneficiaries to avoid costly, and often delayed,
probate procedures.' Professor Austin W. Scott aptly described the
utility of using a trust to dispose of property:
The trust ... is a device for making dispositions of property. And
no other system of law has for this purpose so flexible a tool. It is
this that makes the trust unique .... The purposes for which trusts
2
can be created are as unlimited as the imagination of lawyers.
However, a trust may prove disadvantageous for beneficiaries seeking to obtain complete control of a dead settlor's assets. A beneficiary
may seek early termination of a trust for any number of reasonsbecause he is unhappy with trust arrangements; he is capable of managing trust property; he prefers owning trust property outright; or he
suffers a change in circumstances. Premature trust termination may
be possible if a trust has flexible features authorizing early termination to accommodate a beneficiary's changing needs or circumstances.
However, American jurisdictions generally prohibit premature trust
termination absent such flexible features or if a trust's stated conditions or purposes have not been accomplished. Indeed, American
courts prohibit premature trust termination even if all beneficiaries
are sui juris3 and consent to early termination.'
1. See JESSE DUKEMINIER &
571 (5th ed. 1995).
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§ 1, at 2 (4th ed. 1987). In fact, in 1991, American banks managed almost

900,000 irrevocable trusts worth $450 billion. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra
note 1, at 571. In addition, individual trustees reportedly handled billions of dollars
held in trust. See id.
3. Suijuris means "[h]aving capacity to manage one's own affairs; not under legal
disability to act for one's self." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1434 (6th ed. 1990).
4. See 4 AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScoTr & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE Law
OF TRUSTS § 337, at 431 (4th ed. 1989). However, premature trust termination may
be easily accomplished if a settlor is still alive and he and all the beneficiaries agree to
early termination. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 646. Thus, premature trust termination problems generally arise when a settlor is dead or refuses to

consent to the termination of a trust. This comment focuses solely on the possibility

of early trust termination when all beneficiaries consent after the death of a settlor.
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Premature trust termination cases often result from a deceased settlor's failure to state his reasons for creating a trust in the trust document. Failure to state a trust's specific purposes may arise from a
deceased settlor's oversight or from poor attorney drafting.
For example, a father creates a testamentary trust for his ten year
old son that terminates when his son reaches age thirty-five. The father's unstated purposes in creating the trust are to pay for his son's
education and to provide his son with income until he becomes selfsufficient. However, the father fails to specify his purposes behind
creation of the trust in the trust document, and he fails to empower
either his son or the trustee to prematurely terminate the trust if his
son becomes financially independent before reaching age thirty-five.
If the settlor's son obtains a master's degree in finance, becomes an
expert in stock investments, and has a stable job with an annual income of sixty thousand dollars by the time he turns twenty-six years
old, the settlor's purposes in creating the trust have been accomplished. Alternatively, if the settlor's son needs money to pay his minor child's medical expenses, but the settlor's son is only twenty-six
years old, the settlor's son may be forced to sell his interest in the trust
to a third party at a price below the value of his interest because he
has not met the condition for trust termination stated in the trust
document.
In both scenarios, because most American jurisdictions adhere to
the long-standing Claflin doctrine,5 the son may not terminate the
trust because he has not met the condition required by the settlor to
terminate the trust-that is, attaining age thirty-five. The Claflin doctrine, followed in Texas, prevents premature termination of a trust unless its material purposes have been accomplished, even
if all
6
beneficiaries are sui juris and agree to terminate the trust.

Section 112.054 of the Texas Property Code ("Section 112.054") addresses judicial modification or termination of a trust. 7 Section
5. See 4 ScoTt &

FRATCHER,

supra note 4, § 337.3 at 452-54;

GEORGE GLEASON

BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1008,

at 420-33 (2d rev. ed. 1983).
6. See 4 ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 4, § 337.1, at 443-44. The Claflin doctrine was promulgated by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Claflin v. Claflin, 20
N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889). In Claflin, the sole beneficiary of a trust was to receive trust
payments in three installments: ten thousand dollars at age twenty-one, ten thousand
dollars at age twenty-five, and the remainder when he reached age thirty. See id. at
455. However, when the beneficiary turned twenty-one, he petitioned the court to
transfer the remainder of his trust interest. See id. The court denied his petition for
early trust termination, reasoning that "the restriction upon the plaintiff's possession
and control is, we think, one that the testator had a right to make; other provisions for
the plaintiff are contained in the will, apparently sufficient for his support; and we see
no good reason why the intention of the testator should not be carried out." Id. at
456. Although the trust involved in Claflin was not a spendthrift trust, the Claflin
court reasoned that the trust's postponement of payment clause had the same effect as
that of a spendthrift trust. See id.
7. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.054 (West 1995).
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112.054 rigidly follows the Claflin doctrine, allowing premature judicial termination of an active trust upon petition by a trustee or beneficiary only under narrow circumstances.' The purpose of Section
112.054 is to effect a settlor's intent and to provide certainty and predictability with a bright line rule restricting a beneficiary's recourse to
early judicial trust termination.
However, rigid adherence to the Claflin doctrine may create consequences a deceased settlor did not intend and may preclude actions a
settlor might readily have approved. Furthermore, rigid adherence to
a trust's terms, under the guise of honoring a settlor's intent, may result in a beneficiary's incurring unnecessary trust fees after a trust's
unstated purposes have been accomplished because a trust condition
has not been fulfilled.
Section I of this comment examines the historical background of the
Claflin doctrine. Section II discusses Texas cases applying the Claflin
doctrine. Section III critically analyzes Section 112.054 which restricts
premature trust termination. Section IV proposes adopting an
amendment to the Texas Property Code to permit premature judicial
termination of a non-spendthrift trust if all beneficiaries are sui juris
and consent. 9
8. See id. Under Section 112.054, judicial modification or termination of a trust is
allowed under the following circumstances:
(a) On the petition of a trustee or a beneficiary, a court may order ... that
the terms of the trust be modified ... or that the trust be terminated in
whole or in part, if:
(1) the purposes of the trust have been fulfilled or have become illegal or
impossible to fulfill; or
(2) because of circumstances not known to or anticipated by the settlor,
compliance with the terms of the trust would defeat or substantially impair
the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust.
(b) The court shall exercise its discretion to order a modification or termination under Subsection (a) in the manner that conforms as nearly as possible
to the intention of the settlor. The court shall consider spendthrift provisions as a factor in making its decision whether to modify or terminate, but
the court is not precluded from exercising its discretion to modify or terminate solely because the trust is a spendthrift trust.
9. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 5, § 1007 (rev. 2d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1994)
(citing CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. § 15403 (West 1991)) (permitting a court to exercise
discretionary power and to take a balancing approach to the premature termination
of a non-spendthrift trust upon the petition of all beneficiaries, regardless of whether
the material purposes of a trust are accomplished. Thus, if the court finds the reason
for termination outweighs the interest in accomplishing a trust's material purpose, it
will likely terminate the trust). See also Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Missouri'sRepeal of the
Claflin Doctrine-New View of the Policy Against Perpetuities?,50 Mo. L. REV. 805,
807 (1985) (suggesting Mo. ANN. STAT. § 456.590(2), enacted in 1983, "repeals, at
least in part, the Claflin doctrine" so that if all beneficiaries have reached majority
and are of sound mind, they are entitled to vary or terminate a trust even if that action will defeat a material purpose of the settlor). Mo. ANN. STAT. § 456.590(2) (West
1992) reads as follows:
2. When all of the adult beneficiaries who are not disabled consent, the
court may, upon finding that such variation will benefit the disabled, minor,
unborn and unascertained beneficiaries, vary the terms of a private trust so
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CLAFLIN DOCTRINE

Historically, American courts consider a dead settlor, not a living
beneficiary, to be an owner of trust property with an absolute right to
dispose of his property as he sees fit, provided his disposition does not
contravene public policy." Accordingly, American courts place great
emphasis on carrying out a dead settlor's intentions." By readily accepting the Claflin doctrine, a substantial majority of American jurisdictions expressly favor a dead donor's right to dispose of property
2
over a living donee's right to enjoy a gift free of restraints.'
However, prior to the adoption of the Claflin doctrine, American
courts generally applied the English common law rule derived from
Saunders v. Vautier.'3 The Saunders rule permits early trust termination before the event or condition designated as triggering termination
has occurred or before the trust's stated purpose has been
accomplished. 4
In Saunders, a twenty-one year old sole beneficiary sought premature judicial termination of a testamentary trust scheduled by its terms
to terminate when he reached age twenty-five.' 5 The Saunders court
permitted premature termination of the trust because the sole living
beneficiary had an absolute and indefeasible right to the gift.' 6 Thus,

the court held the beneficiary had a right to demand the transfer of
property held in trust once he reached majority.' 7
The Saunders rule subsequently was interpreted by English courts
to provide that a sole beneficiary under no legal incapacity may compel termination of a trust despite a testator's intent that the trust teras to reduce or eliminate the interests of some beneficiaries and increase
those of others, to change the times or amounts of payments and distributions to beneficiaries, or to provide for termination of the trust at a time
earlier or later than that specified by the terms.
10. See, e.g., Claflin v. Claffin, 20 N.E. 454, 456 (Mass. 1889); Lanius v. Fletcher,
101 S.W. 1076, 1078 (Tex. 1907).
11. See 4 Scorr & FRATCHER, supra note 4, § 337, at 433. See, e.g., Albritton v.
Albritton, 600 So. 2d 1328, 1331 (La. 1992) (holding the settlor's intention controls in
construing the trust); Myrick v. Moody, 802 S.W.2d 735, 738 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (holding the primary objective of trial courts is to construe trusts to determine the intent of the makers); Aberg v. First Nat'l Bank, 450
S.W.2d 403, 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ ref. n.r.e.) (holding the cardinal
rule in construing trust instruments is to enforce the intention of settlors); Coffee v.
William Marsh Rice Univ., 408 S.W.2d 269, 273 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding the intent of settlors is determinative).
12. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1203 (1985).
13. 49 Eng. Rep. 282 (1841). See Alexander, supra note 12, at 1201 n.38 (listing
early American cases following the English common law. rule). See also 4 Scorr &
FRATCHER, supra note 4, § 337.3, at 450 n.2 (collection of cases allowing early trust
termination upon consent of all beneficiaries in Commonwealth countries).
14. See 49 Eng. Rep. at 282.
15. See id.
16. See id.

17. See id.
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minate on a later date.'" The rationale behind this liberal approach to
premature trust termination is that English courts considered property
held in trust to belong to a beneficiary, not to a dead settlor. 19 Thus,
under the Saunders rule, a beneficiary has a right to control and disprovided he is the sole beneficiary
pose of trust property as he wishes,
20
incapacity.
legal
no
under
and
The Saunders approach appears to be based on the public policy
"favoring the free alienability" 21 of property and is consistent with the
English courts' treatment of spendthrift trusts. English courts invalidated the spendthrift trust doctrine 22 which allows a settlor to restrict
the voluntary and involuntary alienation of trust property.23 This invalidation was premised on the principle that "a restraint on aliena24
tion is inconsistent with the conveyance of an absolute interest.
Furthermore, English courts recognize that a beneficiary with an
absolute and indefeasible interest in trust property may sell his interest to a third party. 25 However, since a third-party purchaser, like a
trust beneficiary, is bound by the terms of the trust, a beneficiary
often can only sell trust property at a price substantially below the
actual value of the beneficiary's interest. 26 Thus, although a settlor
may include a condition or terminationevent restricting a beneficiary's
access to trust principal for the purpose of ensuring the beneficiary's
future financial stability, the condition may actually force the beneficiary to sell his interest to a third party at a discounted price because
courts refuse to prematurely terminate the trust.
Based on public policy considerations, English Parliament eventually enacted the Saunders doctrine into the English Variation of Trusts
Act of 1958.27 This Act empowers the courts to modify or terminate
18. See Alexander, supra note 12, at 1201.
19. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 647.
20. See Saunders, 49 Eng. Rep. at 282; Alexander, supra note 12, at 1201;
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 647.
21. Gail Boreman Bird, Trust Termination: Unborn, Living and Dead HandsToo Many Fingers in the Trust Pie, 36 HASTINGS L. J. 563, 578 (1985).
22. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 5, § 1008, at 412-13; 4 ScoTT &
FRATCHER, supra note 4, § 337, at 433.
23. 2A
TRUSTS

AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScoTr & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF

§ 151 (4th ed. 1987).

24. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 5, § 1008, at 412-13.
25. See Curtis v. Lukin, 49 Eng. Rep. 533 (1842) in which the court stated:
[The beneficiary] has the legal power of disposing of [trust property], he may
sell, charge, or assign it, for he has an absolute, indefeasible interest in a
thing defined and certain.... [Slince the legatee has such the legal right and
power over the property, and can deal with it as he pleases, [the court] will
not subject him to the disadvantage of raising money by selling or charging
his interest, when the thing is his own, at this very moment.
Id. at 536.
26. Beneficiaries in England can sell their future interests in the auction market.
See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 640.
27. See Wiedenbeck, supra note 9, at 813-14.
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trusts and "[to] consent to modification or termination of a trust on
behalf of incompetent, minor, or unborn beneficiaries whenever the
court finds it beneficial to the beneficiaries."28
However, in contrast to English trust beneficiaries, American trust
beneficiaries have had little success in loosening the grip of a dead
settlor's hand. The Claflin doctrine, adopted by a majority of courts in
the United States, has posed an obstacle to premature trust termination.29 Indeed, American courts generally strive to carry out a settlor's intent, 3° "even though such action may thwart the desires and
needs of the beneficiaries." ' 3 1 Thus, most American courts consistently hold a trust cannot be terminated unless the material purposes
of the trust have been fulfilled, regardless of whether all trust beneficiaries are adults, are of sound mind, and have consented.32
Furthermore, the position taken by courts following the Claflin doctrine is "consistent with the attitude of the great majority of American
courts in sustaining spendthrift trusts. ' 33 By sustaining the spendthrift
trust, American courts explicitly recognize a dead settlor's right to
control the disposition of his property, and recognize "the power of
28. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 647. Under the Variation of
Trusts Act of 1958, judicial approval to modify or terminate a trust is required only on
behalf of beneficiaries who are incapacitated, minor, unborn, or otherwise unascertained. See Wiedenbeck, supra note 9, at 813-14. However, judicial approval is unnecessary when "all of the beneficiaries in the trust are in existence and sui juris." Id.
In such cases, beneficiaries may terminate the trust upon agreement and a dead settlor's intention that a trust continue is not considered. See id.
29. See Wiedenbeck, supra note 9, at 807-12.
30. See, e.g., Albritton v. Albritton, 600 So. 2d 1328, 1331-32 (La. 1992) (refusing
to hold a beneficiary's interest above a settlor's intent).
31. Bird, supra note 21, at 580.
32. See, e.g., Adams v. Link, 145 A.2d 753, 756 (Conn. 1958) (refusing to approve
an agreement between the life beneficiary and the remaindermen to prematurely terminate the trust notwithstanding the fact that the trust was not a spendthrift trust);
Mohler v. Wesner, 47 N.E.2d 64, 66 (IM.1943) (holding trusts could not be terminated
by beneficiary agreements except where the design and object of the trust have been
accomplished); Maley v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 92 N.E.2d 727, 733 (Ind. App. 1950)
(stating the fact that the trustee did not make investments in accordance with the
wishes of the beneficiary was not a situation creating an impossibility of performance
that would serve as a cause of action for premature trust termination); Young v. Robinette, 239 S.W.2d 91, 91 (Ky. 1951) (holding sale of real property devised in a trust did
not make the trust inactive, and proceeds from the sale were to remain in the trust
until termination date of the trust); Allen v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 67 N.E.2d
472, 474 (Mass. 1946) (stating no circumstances were shown to the court that made it
impossible to carry out the trust in strict accordance with its expressed purpose);
Thomson v. Union Nat'l Bank, 291 S.W.2d 178, 182-83 (Mo. 1956) (entering judgment
against the beneficiaries who sought early termination of a trust to put the trust
corpus in a new trust to allow more lucrative investments than would the established
trust).
33. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 5, § 1008, at 434. A spendthrift trust is "created to provide a fund for the maintenance of a beneficiary and at the same time to
secure the fund against his improvidence or incapacity; provisions against alienation
of the trust fund by the voluntary act of the beneficiary or by his creditors are its usual
incidents." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1400 (6th ed. 1990).

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol3/iss1/8
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V3.I1.6

6

Han: Premature Judicial Termination of Non-Spendthrift Trusts: Reconci

1996]

PREMATURE JUDICIAL TERMINATION

the donor to reach into3 4the-future and control his donees and their
methods of enjoyment.
Professor Scott characterizes the difference in judicial attitudes of
the English and American
courts as being based on policy considera35
tions rather than logic:
The American courts have laid emphasis on the idea that the wishes
of the settlor should be controlling except where it would be opposed to some definite policy to give effect to his desires. In England, on the other hand, the courts have felt that although the
extent of the interests of the beneficiaries depends on the intention
of the settlor, the control of their interests should be in their own
hands, except where the interests of others limit such control. In
the United States the courts take the view that the settlor can dispose of his property as he likes. In England the beneficiary of a
trust can dispose of his interest as he likes. These different points of
view appear in the attitude of the courts of the two countries toward
spendthrift trusts. As we have seen, the English courts have consistently held that the settlor cannot make the interests of the beneficiaries of a trust inalienable by them, whereas a great majority of
the American courts have permitted the settlor to impose such a
restraint on alienation. Similarly, the courts in the two countries
have reached different results where the question is one of the
power of the beneficiaries to terminate the trust. In England the
beneficiaries, if they all consent and are all sui juris, can at any time
terminate the trust, even though the purposes for which the trust
was created by the settlor have not been fully accomplished. The
trust property belongs beneficially to them alone, and they have
power to control its disposition. On the other hand, in the United
States the wishes of the settlor in creating the trust are paramount
to the wishes of the beneficiaries. Even though the beneficiaries all
consent and all are sui juris, they cannot compel the termination of
the trust if such termination would run counter to the intention of
the settlor in creating the trust.36
Even conceding the difference in judicial attitudes concerning treatment of trusts is based on policy considerations, one may wonder why
"Americans permit more extensive dead-hand control through trusts
than do the English-a people whose whole history since the Conquest has been marked by inventions of lawyers to assist their rich
37
clients in controlling their descendants' fortunes after their deaths.

34. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 5, § 1008, at 434.
35. See 4 ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 4, § 337.3 at 455.
36. Id. at 433. See Wiedenbeck, supra note 9, At 809.
37. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note
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ADOPTION OF THE CLAFL/N DOCTRINE IN TEXAS

The Texas Supreme Court's decision in Lanius v. Fletcher established the Claflin doctrine in Texas.38 In Lanius, a daughter sought
early termination of a testamentary trust established by her mother. 9
Under the terms of the trust, the daughter was to receive only the
interest generated by the trust property during her husband's lifetime,
and after his death, the corpus of the trust.4 0 The Texas Supreme
Court reversed the lower courts' decisions and refused to permit early
termination of the trust, holding "the purposes of the trust have not
been accomplished."'" The court opined the mother clearly expressed
her intention in the will that "the property should not be subject to the
control of [the daughter's husband], and that the trust should continue
as long as he should live."'42 Thus, the court held because the husband
was still living, the trust could not be prematurely terminated. 3
In support of its holding, the court declared a property owner has
an "absolute right" to dispose of property in any manner she wishes,
and imposing restrictions on property use is legitimate provided the
restrictions do not violate public policy or the law."4 Thus, the court
refused to inquire into the unjustness or unreasonableness of the restriction "however much the court might45differ from the testatrix as to
the right or policy of such a provision.
For many years, Texas courts followed the Claflin doctrine adopted
47
in Lanius.4 6 However, in 1971, in Alamo National Bank v. Daubert,
the Beaumont Court of Appeals carved out an exception. In Daubert,
38. 101 S.W. 1076 (Tex. 1907). See Lynn Alexander, Note, Trusts- TerminationCourt CannotJudicially Terminate Testamentary Trust on Grounds that Primary Purposes Have Been Accomplished If Trust Calls for Termination at Stated Event: Frost

National Bank of San Antonio v. Newton, 54 S. W.2d 149 (Tex. 1977), 9 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 748, 754 (1978).
39. See Lanius, 101 S.W. at 1076.
40. See id. The relevant portion of the testamentary trust provided the executor
"'shall hold [the daughter's portion of the beneficial interest] as trustee, and keep it
invested paying her the interest during the lifetime of her husband, John S. Fletcher,
and only the interest shall be paid her."' Id. (quoting from Mrs. Mary A. Gilpin's

will).
41. Id. at 1078.
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. Id. The court agreed with the Claflin decision that "a testator has a right to
dispose of his own property with such restrictions and limitations, not repugnant to
law, as he sees fit, and that his intentions ought to be carried out, unless they contravene some positive rule of law, or are against public policy." Claflin v. Claflin, 20
N.E. 454, 456 (Mass. 1889).
45. 101 S.W. at 1078.
46. See, e.g., McNeill v. St. Aubin, 209 S.W. 781, 785 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston

1919, no writ) (denying termination until minor beneficiaries reached age twentyone); Brown v. Scherck, 393 S.W.2d 172, 181 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1965,
no writ) (refusing to grant an early termination of a testamentary trust although all
the adult beneficiaries agreed to termination).
47. 467 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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a testator created two testamentary trusts, one for the benefit of his
wife and the other for the benefit of his daughter.48 However, the
wife had a contingent remainder in the daughter's trust that would
terminate when the daughter attained age thirty-five, unless the wife
was still living.49 The mother elected to take against the will and renounced all her rights in the trusts."0 Instead, she took her half-interest in the community property that was "without any control from the
grave."51 Subsequently, the daughter, on reaching age thirty-five,
sought to judicially terminate the trust to receive the remaining corpus
of the trust estate. 2
The Daubert court held the trust terminated when the daughter attained age thirty-five, even though the mother was still living. 3 The
court reasoned the primarypurpose of the daughter's trust was to provide support for the daughter until she attained the age of thirtyfive.5 4 Furthermore, the court reasoned, the mother's contingent interest in the daughter's trust was only an incidental purpose which
failed to necessitate continuation of the trust.55 Thus, the Daubert
court permitted premature termination of the trust because the primary purpose of the trust was fulfilled.
Nevertheless, the Texas Supreme Court in Frost National Bank v.
Newton 5 6 subsequently disapproved of the primary versus incidental
57 In Frost,the majority opinion
purpose approach applied in Daubert.
declared "the better rule of law is that beneficiaries of a trust can consent to its termination only where all purposes of the trust have been
accomplished. ' 58 Thus, the court reversed the lowers courts' decisions
which had permitted premature trust termination upon the accom48. See id. at 556-57.
49. See id. at 557.
50. See id. at 556.
51. Id. at 560.
52. See id. at 558.
53. See id. at 561-62.
54. See id. at 560.
55. See id. at 561.
56. 554 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. 1977).
57. See id. at 154. In Frost, the testatrix created a testamentary trust to pay the
high school and college educational expenses of her great-nephew and great-nieces.
See id. at 151. The trust directed the trustee, at his discretion, to pay any excess income in equal shares to two other named beneficiaries (two nieces). See id. at 152.
Upon the termination of the trust, the remaining trust estate was to be given in equal
shares to the same two other named beneficiaries. See id. However, in the event
either of the named beneficiaries was not living, her share would go to the deceased
beneficiary's then-living children, in equal shares. 'See id. The trust provided it would
continue through the lifetime of the last survivor of the named beneficiaries and
would terminate on his death, unless the trust income became insufficient. See id. at
151. The main dispute in this case was whether the trust could be terminated when
the beneficiaries completed their education, which the beneficiaries claimed constituted the primary purpose of the trust. See id. at 153.
58. Id. at 154 (emphasis added).
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plishment of the primary purpose of the trust-completion of the
three beneficiaries' education."
The court further held that if a trust expressly states it terminates
upon "the happening of specified events," courts will not judicially
terminate trusts merely because their primary purposes have been accomplished.6" Furthermore, absent an express declaration of purposes in a trust instrument, courts will refuse to determine which
purpose is primary and which is incidental, because to do so would
"take the court beyond the express language of the will into the realm
of conjecture and speculation."61
However, three justices dissented. 62 The Chief Justice stated, "the
better rule would be that where a trust is not a spendthrift trust, and
the material purposes of the trust have been accomplished, an agreement by all beneficiaries to terminate the trust should be given effect,
provided none of the beneficiaries is under an incapacity. '63 The dissenting justices argued the testatrix clearly indicated in the trust that
the payment of excess income to the beneficiaries was merely "an incidental or minor purpose of the trust," 64 while providing the educational expenses for the beneficiaries was the primarypurpose.65 Since
all student beneficiaries had completed their education, the dissent
found no primary purpose obstacle preventing premature judicial termination of the trust.'
Nevertheless, the Texas Legislature eventually codified the Frost
decision in the Texas Property Code in 1985, thereby preventing early
termination of an active trust unless all purposes of the trust have
been accomplished. 67
III.

SECTION 112.054 OF THE TEXAS PROPERTY CODE

Section 112.054 of the Texas Property Code requires all purposes of
a trust be fulfilled before a trust may be judicially terminated, except
in situations where continuance of a trust is illegal or impossible. 6'
However, the soundness of such an inflexible rule is questionable if its
underlying policy is to honor a dead settlor's intent.6 9
59. See id. at 153-54.
60. Id. at 154.
61. Id.

62. See id.

63. Id. at 155 (Greenhill, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
64. Id. (emphasis added).

65. See id. at 154.
66. See id. at 155.

67. Act 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 567, art. 2, § 2, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3332 (codified as amended at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.§ 112.054 (West 1995)).
68. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.112.054 (West 1995).
69. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Since the Code requires that all purposes of a trust be accomplished, beneficiaries may be discouraged from seeking a
premature termination of a trust.
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Although Section 112.054 was enacted to effect a settlor's intent, its
requirement that all trust purposes must be accomplished may actually defeat a settlor's intent. For instance, if a settlor designated a
termination date or event in the trust instrument, but failed to state
the trust's purpose, a beneficiary may not compel early termination of
the trust, even if its known, but unstated, purpose has already been
accomplished.
The first hypothetical in this comment's introduction reflects such a
situation. There, the settlor's unwritten purpose was to provide for his
son's education and financial support until he became self-sufficient.
However, because the settlor specified a condition of trust termination-arrival of the son's thirty-fifth birth date-but failed to specify
his purpose in creating the trust, the son probably cannot compel early
judicial termination of the trust. Further, in the second hypothetical, a
prohibition on early trust termination actually defeats the settlor's
purpose-to ensure his son's future financial stability-because the
son may be forced to sell his trust interest at a discounted price to a
third party to obtain money to pay his child's medical expenses. Thus,
absent express declarations of purposes in trust documents, notwithstanding the settlor's real purpose, courts that follow Section 112.054
and the Frost holding will refuse to grant early termination of trusts,
because the conditions that trigger trust termination have not been
accomplished.7 ° Consequently, a strict application of the all purposes
approach to trust termination may often defeat the true intent of a
settlor.
For example, in Moxley v. Title Insurance & Trust Co.,7 1 a beneficiary sought early termination of a testamentary trust created by her
mother. 72 The testatrix/mother, separated from her husband, established the daughter's trust in her will, intending to provide financial
security for her minor daughter in the event the child's father remarried and left his property to others. 73 However, the father, who died
several years after the mother, left his property to the daughter in
another trust.7n Thus, it was no longer necessary for the daughter to
depend solely on her mother's smaller trust for future financial
security.
When the married daughter/beneficiary turned twenty-six, she
sought termination of the trust, seeking to reach the trust corpus for
70. The Frost court disallowed termination of the trust because the trust expressly
provided it would terminate upon the happening of specified events. Frost Nat'l Bank
v. Newton, 554 S.W.2d 149, 154 (Tex. 1977).
71. 165 P.2d 15 (Cal. 1946).
72. See id. Under the trust, the daughter was to receive the trust principal and any
accumulated income at age thirty-five. See id. at 16.
73. See id. at 25 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
74. See id. at 17. The trust assets left by the father allegedly exceeded one-half
million dollars while the one created by the mother had a value of about $37,500. See
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the purchase of a house.75 The daughter claimed two grounds justified
early termination of the trust established by her mother: 1) the
"[c]hange of circumstances not anticipated by the testatrix"76 and 2)
the "accomplishment of the objects of the trust."77 Additionally, the
daughter pointed out the trust had no spendthrift provision.78
The Moxley court rejected the daughter's arguments, reasoning that
her changed circumstances claim "amounts to no more than the pleading of mere considerations of convenience to herself as ground for
frustration of the testamentary design for administration of the
trust."7 9 Furthermore, the court explained that termination of an active trust containing a designated termination date and whose terms
are reasonable and valid is against "both reason and the great weight
of authority" in this country.8" Thus, the court
8 1 disregarded the absence of the spendthrift features in the trust.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Traynor underscored the court's
inherent equitable power to grant early termination of a non-spendthrift trust if all beneficiaries are sui juris and consent to its termination, and if a court of equity finds that termination of the trust will
serve the beneficiaries' interests.82 He further emphasized "the principal purpose of a trust is to benefit the beneficiaries. 81 3 Thus, in the
event circumstances unanticipated by the settlor arise subsequent to
the creation of a trust, the intent of a settlor will be better served by
the court's "weighing the actual interests of the beneficiary of a trust
84
in its termination against the benefits intended by its continuance, 1
rather than demanding "adequate proof be offered that the present
circumstances could not be or were not anticipated by the settlor."85
75. See id.
76. Id. at 19.
77. Id. The daughter claimed "the primary purpose of the trust was to protect
[her] during her minority in providing for her support, education and maintenance"
and "such purpose has been accomplished." Id. at 17. She further alleged because of
her father's death, she was "unable to have comforts and necessities and to buy a
home as she could if her father were alive ... and said situation was not contemplated
by [her] mother and therefore no provision was made for the same." Id.
78. See id. at 17.
79. Id. at 19.
80. Id. at 20. Justice Traynor quoted Professor Bogert in his dissent:
The majority American position to the effect that non-spendthrift trusts are
indestructible as long as they are active and have a purpose to be performed
has the appearance of strength, in that it stresses respect for the intent of the
settlor, harmony with the spendthrift trust doctrine, and refusal by the courts
to make wills and deeds; but it seems in fact an impractical rule which brings
about an adherence to theory but no practical individual or social benefit. 4
Bogart, Trusts, 2940.
Id. at 24 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
81. See id. at 18.
82. See id. at 22 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 23.
84. Id. at 23-24.
85. Id. at 24.
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Additionally, Justice Traynor concluded the court should not preclude the possibility of early trust termination if it finds "the present
needs of the beneficiary outweigh his interest in future security. 86
Further, he declared that a court, satisfied that the beneficiary's current needs should prevail, may terminate a trust even though the settlor's intent is to provide a beneficiary with future financial security. 87
Justice Traynor found the beneficiary had sufficient grounds to terminate the trust prematurely.
The Texas Property Code's requirement that all purposes of a trust
must be fulfilled prior to judicial termination leaves no room for reconciling a settlor's stated or presumed intent with a beneficiary's
needs or interests. For example, the Code's early termination prohibition is enforceable only against a beneficiary seeking judicial termina88
tion of a trust to access trust principal without a trustee's consent.
The Code does not, however, prohibit a trust beneficiary from selling
his interest to a third-party for a generally discounted price to receive
trust principal indirectly, 9 or from offering a trustee financial inducements to obtain his consent to terminate the trust. Professor Bogert
highlights this flaw:
[I]t is not a result which the court would have sanctioned if its advice had been asked. This penalizes beneficiaries who are overconscientious and seek the instruction of the court, or who have a
trustee who is anxious to get the commissions from the trust and
hence will not consent to termination.... Is it good policy to make
the result depend on the attitude of the trustee in the matter, when
he is merely a representative who should be following the interests
of the beneficiaries and90 should not be primarily thinking of benefits
from his commission?
Thus, the Code has no effect on a beneficiary's premature trust termination either through his purchasing a "trustee's consent to termination", 9 or through sale of his interest to a third party. Indeed, such
circumstances often arise when a trust document does not contain a
spendthrift provision, but contains a condition that merely postpones
a beneficiary's enjoyment of the trust corpus. 92 Accordingly, one un86. Id.
87. See id.
88. See Wiedenbeck, supra note 9, at 812.
89. The Claflin court acknowledged the possibility that a beneficiary could sell his
interest prior to the natural termination of the trust, but nevertheless refused to grant
the decree, reasoning that "[i]t is true that the plaintiffs interest is alienable by him,
and can be taken by his creditors to pay his debts, but it does not follow because the
testator has not imposed all possible restrictions that the restrictions which he has
imposed should not be carried into effect." Clattin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454, 456 (Mass.
1889).
90. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 5, § 1008, at 419.
91. Wiedenbeck, supra note 9, at 812.
92. Postponement of enjoyment occurs when a trust vests a beneficial interest in a

beneficiary and provides for payment of income to the beneficiary for a designated
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intended effect of the Texas Property Code's all purposes requirement
is to allow a trustee to set the price a beneficiary must pay him to
obtain his consent to early termination. 93 It is possible the only party
actually benefitting from the Code's rigid requirement that all purposes of a trust must be accomplished prior to judicial termination is a
trustee. Considering these possibilities, a more sound policy would be
elimination of the all purposes rule in cases involving non-spendthrift
trusts, to permit early judicial termination of trusts if all beneficiaries,
who are sui juris, agree to termination and petition the court.
IV.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO SECTION
PROPERTY CODE

112.054 OF THE TEXAS

Whatever administrative plan a settlor may select for disposing of
his assets, his principal intent in creating a trust is undoubtedly to ensure that beneficiaries enjoy and utilize the fruits of his lifetime endeavors. Considering that basic purpose, a rule governing trust
termination should be flexible for beneficiaries to maximize trust assets. In contrast, a strict requirement that all purposes of a trust must
be accomplished before a trust may be judicially terminated may fail
to maximize trust assets. In fact, application of the all purposes requirement may result in a waste of trust assets or an opportunity for a
trustee to extort money from a beneficiary. A more flexible approach
should be adopted to reconcile a settlor's intent with a beneficiary's
needs. Premature trust termination should be considered when beneficiaries suffer a change in circumstances or when the real purposes of
the trust are accomplished. 94 Further, a flexible rule assures that a
settlor's underlying purpose behind creation of a trust is accomplished-that beneficiaries achieve the maximum benefits of a trust.
The Texas Legislature should adopt a flexible approach to premature trust termination similar to Section 15403 of the California Probate Code ("CPC 15403"). 95 CPC 15403 permits modification or
term and payment of the remaining trust corpus at the close of that period of time.
See 4 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 4, § 337.3 at 449. Both Claflin v. Claflin, 20
N.E. 454, 456 (Mass. 1889) and Saunders v. Vautier, 49 Eng. Rep. 282 (1841) involved
the postponement of enjoyment of trusts.
93. See discussion supra notes 88-89.and accompanying text. Chief Justice Greenhill advocated the adoption of the material purpose doctrine set out in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 to allow termination of a non-spendthrift trust if the
beneficiaries consent and if the material purpose of the trust has been fulfilled. Frost
Nat'l Bank v. Newton, 554 S.W.2d 149, 155 (Tex. 1977) (Greenhill, C. J.dissenting).
Therefore, it is not at all surprising that the material purpose doctrine advocated by
Chief Justice Greenhill in his dissent in Frost aroused "significant concern in the
banking community" because many banks perform trust services for a fee. Steve R.
Akers, Address Before the Central Texas Estate Planning Council (1993) (transcript
on file at Jenkins & Gilchrist, A Prof. Corp., Dallas, Tex.).
94. See Bird, supra note 21, at 563-64. Professor Bird recommended a similar policy in her study prepared for the California Law Revision Commission.
95. CAL. PROB. CODE § 15403 (West 1991) provides as follows:
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termination of an irrevocable non-spendthrift trust if all beneficiaries
petition the court, as well as if "the trust provides for successive beneficiaries or postpones enjoyment of a beneficiary's interest. '96 Further, under the statute, modification or termination of a nonspendthrift trust may occur regardless of whether a material purpose
of the trust has been accomplished. Thus, a California court may terminate a trust if in its discretion it determines the reason for termination "outweighs the interest in accomplishing a material purpose of a
trust."97 CPC 15403 adopted the Restatement of Trusts' material purpose approach, which authorizes trust termination only upon a finding
that the trust's material purpose has been accomplished. 9 8 However,
CPC 15403 modified the Restatement's approach authorizing courts
to exercise a more flexible discretionary power in determining
whether to permit premature trust termination. 99
While CPC 15403 is concededly more flexible than Section 112.054
of the Texas Property Code, the provision still requires courts to determine which purposes of a trust are material and which are incidental. The Texas Legislature should provide Texas courts even greater
flexibility by amending the Texas Property Code to permit courts to
prematurely terminate trusts if the courts simply determine the benefits of trust termination outweigh the benefits of continuation of the
trust until all trust purposes are accomplished.
Additionally, the Texas Legislature should incorporate a provision
allowing courts to exercise discretionary power to approve a proposed
trust termination on behalf of beneficiaries who are "disabled, minor,
unborn, and unascertained, '' 1°° where such termination would be to
their advantage. Absent such a provision, successive beneficiaries,
whose consent cannot be obtained because they are under a legal disa(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), if all beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust consent, they may compel modification or termination of the trust
upon petition to the court.
(b) If the continuance of the trust is necessary to carry out a material purpose of the trust, the trust cannot be modified or terminated unless the
court, in its discretion, determines that the reason for doing so under the
circumstances outweighs the interest in accomplishing a material purpose of
the trust. Under this section the court does not have discretion to permit
termination of a trust that is subject to a valid restraint on transfer of the
beneficiary's interest as provided in Chapter 2 (commending with Section
15300).
96. Id. § 15403 note (Law Revision Comm'n Comment).
97. CAL. PROB. CODE § 15403(a) (West 1991); see supra note 95.
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 (1959). This provision provides:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), if all of the beneficiaries of a trust
consent and none of them is under an incapacity, they can compel the termi-

nation of the trust.

(2) If the continuance of the trust is necessary to carry out a material purpose of the trust, the beneficiaries cannot compel its termination.
Id.
99. CAL. PROB. CODE

100. Mo.

ANN.

§ 15403(b) (West 1991).

STAT. § 456.590(2) (West 1992); see supra note 9.
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bility or because their interests are contingent, may pose obstacles to
early trust termination. 10 1 However, a court authorized by legislative
amendment to use discretion in approving trust terminations may utilize several devices to overcome obstacles posed by beneficiaries with
legal disabilities or contingent interests, including unborn or unascertained beneficiaries.
First, a court may appoint a guardian ad litem to act in a fiduciary
capacity to protect the interests of beneficiaries who are unborn, unascertained, or under a legal disability. 10 2 For instance, in Carroll v.
Carroll,10 3 the Corpus Christi Court of Civil Appeals ordered a receiver's sale of land that represented the corpus of a trust estate, even
though the trust document forbade any sale of trust property and several beneficiaries were incompetent." ° The court held that a guardian
ad litem, appointed to represent the interests of the incompetent beneficiaries, had provided proper counsel and representation of those
beneficiaries. 10 5
However, a guardian ad litem representing protected class members
should not focus solely on individual financial benefits, but rather
should consider non-pecuniary benefits that may be obtained by early
trust termination. 0 6 For example, a Wisconsin statute provides that
"[a] guardian ad litem for such beneficiary may rely on general family
benefits accruing to living members of the beneficiary's family as a
basis for approving a revocation, modification or termination of a
trust or any part thereof."' 1 7
Second, a court may utilize the doctrine of virtual representation in
early trust termination cases. Under the doctrine of virtual representation, living members of the same class, or those whose interests are
substantially similar to persons not represented, can represent the absent members and their interests.' 018 For example, in Christie v. Lowrey, 109 the Dallas Court of Appeals held the doctrine of virtual
representation applies where all contingent remaindermen and poten101. See Hamerstrom v. Commerce Bank, 808 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991)

(discussing court's protection of unnamed, unborn and unascertained remaindermen);
Frost Nat'l Bank v. Newton, 554 S.W.2d 149, 153 (Tex. 1977) (noting guardian ad
litem for unborn and unadopted children opposed early trust termination); Brown v.
Scherck, 393 S.W.2d 172, 181 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1965, no writ) (holding

trustees have a duty to protect the trust's minor contingent beneficiaries).
102. Bird, supra note 21, at 604.
103. 464 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1971, writ dism'd).
104. See id. at 442, 449.
105. See id. at 450. See also Brown v. Scherck, 393 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Corpus Christi 1965, no writ) (appointing a guardian ad litem for minor children,
saying that "trustees owe a duty to protect the interest of the minor contingent beneficiaries of the trusts.") Id. at 181.
106. See Wiedenbeck, supra note 9, at 817-20 (discussing indirect and non-pecuniary benefits).
107. WIs. STAT. ANN.§ 701.12(2) (West 1981).
108. See Bird, supra note 21, at 600.
109. 589 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
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tial contingent remaindermen have identical interests. Thus, living
class members may speak for protected or non-represented class
members. 110
Devices such as appointment of a guardian ad litem or virtual representation may assist a court in deciding whether to permit premature
termination of a trust. However, a court should proceed with caution
as such devices may entail hidden costs. For example, while use of a
guardian ad litem provides greater flexibility and protection for nonrepresented or disabled class members than does virtual representation,"' it can be costly and deplete trust assets. On the other hand,
although virtual representation may not involve additional costs in the
form of guardian ad litem attorney fees, its application to trust terminations may be limited if a conflict of interest arises between the interests of a representative and the interests of represented class
members. Further, if a conflict of interest exists between class members, virtual representation cannot apply." 2 Therefore, the doctrine
of virtual representation should be utilized only after a court determines that all beneficiaries have identical interests. Consequently, a
court must examine all the surrounding circumstances and exercise
discretion in determining whether a proposed premature
trust termi1
nation will benefit the protected class members. 3
In light of the above considerations, Section 112.054 of the Texas
Property Code should be revised to read:
(a) On the petition of a beneficiary or a trustee, a court may order
that the terms of the trust be modified or that the trust be terminated in whole or in part, if:
1) all adult beneficiaries of a non-spendthrift trust under no legal
disability consent, and the court, in its discretion, determines that
the reason for termination or modification, under the circumstances, outweighs the interest in continuation of the trust and such
modification as well as such termination or modification will benefit
the interests of the disabled, minor, unborn and unascertained beneficiaries; or
2) the purposes of the trust have been fulfilled or have become illegal or impossible to fulfill; or
3) because of circumstances not known to or anticipated by the settlor, compliance with the terms of the trust would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the purpose of the trust.
(b) The court shall consider spendthrift provisions as a factor in
making a determination under Subsection (a)(2)(3) whether to terminate or modify a trust, but the court is not precluded from exer110. See id. at 875.
111. See Bird, supra note 21, at 601-02.
112. See id. at 601.
113. See Wiedenbeck, supra note 9, at 817-20 (discussing non-pecuniary benefits
that may be obtained for the protected class members).
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cising its discretion to modify or terminate solely because the trust is
a spendthrift trust.
CONCLUSION

A strict requirement that all purposes of a trust be accomplished
prior to a judicial termination is meritorious because it may carry out
a settlor's written intent and provide judicial economy However, the
merits of such an inflexible rule lose force when the rule effectively
defeats the true purpose of a trust-to benefit a beneficiary-and primarily operates to benefit a trustee, whose role is to administer a trust
for a beneficiary's benefit. Consequently, the Texas Legislature
should re-examine Section 112.054 of the Texas Property Code and
consider amending Section 112.054 to reconcile a dead settlor's intent
with a living beneficiary's needs.
A revision sanctioning judicially approved early termination of a
trust upon written consent of all beneficiaries who are sui juris may
raise concerns that a flood of litigation may result. However, under
the proposed rule, early termination of a trust by a court requires the
unanimous consent of all adult beneficiaries under no legal disability.
Because unanimous consent of all sui juris beneficiaries may not be
easily obtained, it is unlikely that the revision will greatly increase litigation. Furthermore, under the proposed provision, premature trust
termination is conditioned upon a judicial finding that termination
under the circumstances outweighs the interests in continuing the
trust. Thus, a court cannot grant early trust termination on demand,
but only upon a finding that all required factors are present. Finally, a
rule allowing courts to take a more flexible approach in determining
whether to grant premature termination of a trust may better serve
the settlor's intentions than does the current Code provision.
Eun C. Han
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